We propose two families of scalable hash functions for collision{resistant hashing that are highly parallel and based on the generalized fast Fourier transform (FFT). FFT{hashing is based on multipermutations. This is a basic cryptographic primitive for perfect generation of di usion and confusion which generalizes the boxes of the classic FFT. The slower FFT{hash functions iterate a compression function. For the faster FFT{hash functions all rounds are alike with the same number of message words entering each round.
Introduction and surview
We propose two families of hash functions for collision{resistant hashing. These hash functions are scalable, highly parallel and based on the generalized fast Fourier transform (FFT). In comparison to FFT{Hash II we discard the polynomial iteration over a nite eld. This yields an extremely simple and highly parallel design which is entirely de ned by the FFT{graph. The only free parameters are the order 2 k of the FFT, the number of rounds and the boxes which we require to be multipermutations.
Our rst and slower family of hash functions iterates a compression function. For this hashing we have determined, by black box cryptanalysis, the minimal number of rounds that is necessary for collision{ resistant hashing. Black box cryptanalysis shows that iterating a compression function is not the best method for FFT{hashing. Our second and faster family of hash functions uses multiple fan{in of message words. A message word enters four times within the same round. The same number of message words enters each round so that all rounds are alike.
Multipermutations are a new cryptographic primitive for perfect generation of di usion and confusion. For an arbitrary set E we call a permutation B : E 2 ! E 2 , B(a; b) = (B 1 (a; b); B 2 (a; b)) a multipermutation uses a vector space E = IF m over the Galois eld IF = f0; 1g, e.g. IF 8 ; IF 16 ; IF 32 . There is a large variety of multipermutations for these E, both linear and non{linear over IF. Non{linear multipermutations can be generated by composing linear ones with non{linear permutations on E. We can use for this composition the multiplication modulo 2 m + 1.
We present in section 2 a family of compression functions based on FFT{networks. In section 3 we report on black box attacks on these compression functions. In section 4 we propose fast FFT hash algorithms that do not iterate a compression function. In section 5 we present multipermutations for the case that E is a linear space over the eld IF. An example hash algorithm is proposed in section 6.
2 A family of compression functions. Notation 1. We let IF denote the Galois eld of order 2 and let E = IF m be the linear space over the eld IF with dimension m, e.g. m = 8; 16; 32; 64. We call the elements of E words. 2. Let k be a xed integer, k > 0 and let i 2 f0; : : :; 2 k ? 1g. Let i j 2 f0; 1g for j = 0; : : :; k ? 1 denote the j{th bit of i = i 0 + 2i 1 + : : : + 2 k?1 i k?1 . Let the integer i(j) be obtained from i by negating the bit i j . For our purposes it is convenient to de ne for j k that i j = i j(modk) , i(j) = i(j mod k) .
The compression function g k;s : E 2 k ! E 2 k?1 INPUT e i 2 E for i = 0; : : :; 2 k ? 1 (We call H = e i j i 0 = 0] the hash input and M = e i j i 0 = 1] the message input) FOR j = 0; : : :; s DO (e i ; e i(j) ) := B i;j (e i ; e i(j) ) for all i, 0 i < 2 k with i j = 0, in parallel OUTPUT g k;s (H; M) = e i j i s = 0] 2 E 2 k?1 .
The choice of the boxes B i;j : We require that the boxes B i;j perform multipermutations on E 2 . We call a permutation B : E 2 ! E 2 , B(a; b) = (B 1 (a; b); B 2 (a; b)), a multipermutation if for every xed a; b 2 E the mappings B i (a; ); B i ( ; b) for i = 1; 2 are permutations on E. We call the component mappings B i : E 2 ! E i = 1; 2 a bipermutation because they act as a permutation on both inputs. A permutation B : E 2 ! E 2 is a multipermutation i both component mappings B 1 ; B 2 are bipermutations.
It is important that the message inputs e 2i+1 and hash inputs e 2i are mixed by the boxes B i;0 of the rst round j = 0. The hash outputs are from distinct boxes B i;s of the last round j = s. on E 2 k?1 . This is because the boxes B i;j perform permutations on E 2 .
We can represent the algorithm g k;s by a network. It consists of s+1 layers j = 0; : : :; s. Layer j has 2 k?1 vertices B i;j for i = 0; : : :; 2 k ?1 with i j = 0. The edges of the g k;s {network correspond to the inputs/outputs e i ; e i(j) of B i;j . More precisely we let e i;j ; e i(j);j denote the inputs of B i;j and e i;j+1 ; e i(j);j+1 the outputs of B i;j . The hash input is H = e i;0 j i 0 = 0], the hash output is g k;s (H; M) = e i;s+1 j i s = 0] and we have for j = 0; : : :; s :
(e i;j+1 ; e i(j);j+1 ) = B i;j (e i;j ; e i(j);j ) for 0 i < 2 k with i j = 0:
By iterating the compression function g k;s we can transform arbitrary binary messages into a hash value in E 2 k?1 that is m2 k?1 bits long. We require that a given message, consisting of t bits, is padded so that its bit length becomes a multiple of m2 k?1 . We recommend to append to the message a single \1" followed by a suitable number of \0" bits followed by the binary representation of t. So = (u; v) any two words out of a; b; u; v determine the other two. The box B i;j has degree of freedom 2, i.e. any two input/output edges of B i;j determine all edges of B i;j .
Guess an unknown edge e i;j , i.e. try all possible values in E. Evaluate a vertex (box) B i;j , i.e. determine all its edges from two known ones.
The complexity of a step is the number of edge assignments to be tried for this step. Initially the step complexity is 1; it increases by a factor 2 m when guessing a new edge in IF m ; it decreases by a factor 2 m when evaluating a vertex with three known edges. The complexity of the attack is the maximal step complexity over all steps. This complexity depends in a crucial way on the choice of guessed edges and the order in which the boxes are evaluated. The time bound for the attack is the product of the complexity and the time for evaluating all vertices of the g k;s {network. We take the second factor to be 1.
In some attacks we pick random values for certain edges and we hold these values xed. E.g. when H; H 0 are given the edges corresponding to H; H 0 are xed. We assume that all xed edges are uniformly at random. Then the complexity of the attack is the average complexity with respect to the xed random edges.
To invert g k;s we have to evaluate for the given random H; H 0 all boxes of the g k;s {network. To produce a collision for g k;s we x some output words of g k;s at random, we evaluate with these random values all boxes of the network and we apply the birthday paradox to the output words of g k;s that have not been We let I(k; s) and C(k; s) denote the minimal complexity for the inversion of g k;s and for producing g k;s { collisions where the minimum is taken over all black box attacks. The best known black box attacks are based on the following inequalities re ecting a simple divide and conquer argument:
I(1; 0) = 1; I(k; k ? 1) 2 m2 k?2 for k 2 I(k; k ? 1 + t) I(k; k ? 1) I(t + 1; t) for 0 t k ? 1 and k 2 : C(k; k ? 1 + t) 2 m2 k?3 I(t + 1; t) for 0 t k ? 2 and k 3 :
We conjecture that these inequalities are actually equalities. If this holds true they determine the minimal complexities I(k; s) and C(k; s) for all k 2, s k ? 1 and the above tables give the minimal complexities for arbitrary black box attacks. The restriction t k ? 1 (resp. t k ? 2) is due to the inequalities I(k; s) 2 m2 k?1 , C(k; s) 2 m2 k?2 since the length of the hash input/output is 2 m2 k?1 . Under our conjecture the inversion and the collision production have maximal complexity for s = 2k?2 and s = 2k?3, i.e. I(k; 2k ? 2) = 2 m2 k?1 and C(k; 2k ? 3) = 2 m2 k?2 .
In view of the known attacks we are going to improve the hashing h k;s . Here are our main points:
Instead of discarding for every iteration of g k;s half of the hash words e i we combine them with the next message words. Only after processing the entire message we apply the compression function g k;s discarding half the hash words.
Each message word enters repeatedly in the same round. The same number of message words enters each round.
Using the circular rotation R on f0; (e R(2i) ; e R(2i+1) ) OUTPUT h k (M) = e 2i j i = 0; : : :; 2 k?1 ? 1] Speci c proposals for the binary operations op i : E 2 ! E and the multipermutations B i;j : E 2 ! E 2 are given in section 6. We let each rounds j = 0; : : :; dn=`e ? 1 process` 2 k?2 consecutive message words m`j +i for i = 0; : : :;`? 1 . Each message word enters four times. After the last message word corresponding to the compression function g k;s . The number s + 1 of the nal layers can well be smaller than 2k and even 2k ? 2, the number of layers which maximize the complexities I(k; s) and C(k; s). This is because the multiple duplication of the message words seriously complicates the attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? constant and so are the bits of R` n (c) for all n. 2. If gcd(`; m) = 1 , i.e. if`is odd, then L c is a multipermutation if and only if c 6 2 f0 m ; 1 m g. This is because, for odd`, the iterates of R`carry every bit of c to all positions. Further multipermutations can be constructed by composition. The composition of a multipermutation P : E 2 ! E 2 with arbitrary permutations 1 ; 2 : E ! E yields new multipermutations P( 1 (a); 2 (b)); ( 1 P 1 (a; b); 2 P 2 (a; b)) :
Also the inverse of a multipermutation is again a multipermutation.
We nally point to several useful permutations on E. We identify an integer b 2 f0; : : :; where a 0 = 2 m if a = 0 and a 0 = a otherwise. Lai and Massey (1990) use the operation in the case m = 16. If 2 m + 1 is prime e.g. for m = 8; 16 the operation is invertible. Then (E; ) is a cyclic group of order 2 m with neutral element 1. The group (E; ) is isomorphic to ZZ 2 m +1 , the multiplicative group of residues modulo 2 m + 1. We have an isomorphism ' : (E; ) ! ZZ 2 m +1 , '(a) = a 0 .
Lemma 4 If 2 m + 1 is prime then every c 2 E de nes a permutation a 7 ! a c on E. We propose particular boxes B i;j and operations op i for the hash function h 4 of section 4. These propositions are preliminary and subject to further studies. Let E = IF 16 ; m = 16; k = 4;`= 3; s = 5. The choice s = 5 maximizes the collision complexity C(4; s). This may be an overkill due to the multiple duplication Here + is the addition modulo 2 16 on E = f0; : : :; 2 16 ?1g, is the multiplication in E = ZZ 2 16 +1 de ned in section 5, is the bitwise XOR,^is the bitwise logical AND, R is the circular right shift on E, R is the circular shift on f0; 1; : : :; 15g = f0; 1g 4 so that R(i) = 2i for i 7 and R(i) = 1 + 2(i ? 8) for i > 7.
The constants. Let The sequential costs The algorithm processes 48 message bits (three words) per round performing the following operations 22 ; 24 ; 8^; 6 +; 8 R 2i+1 . In total there are 68 operations on E per round. There are 4 additional rounds per message and 8 additional operations in the output. The number of operations on E per message bit 68/48 is smaller than for FFT{Hash II which requires 192 operations per 128 message bits.
The potential of possible speed{up's in this design is twofold:
If we operate on 32 words, i.e. k = 5, instead on 16 words the degree of parallelization is 32.
If we choose for E the set of bit strings of length 32 with a suitable operation we obtain a speed{up factor 2.
It is important to analyse carefully the number of message words that can safely enter per round as we increase k . It is open whether the processing rate of three message words per round is the maximal rate for which the example algorithm is secure.
